In this article we give the details of an effective point counting algorithm for genus two curves over finite fields of characteristic three. The algorithm has an application in the context of curve based cryptography. One distinguished property of the algorithm is that its complexity depends quasi-quadratically on the degree of the finite base field. Our algorithm is a modified version of an earlier method that was developed in joint work with Lubicz. We explain how one can alter the original algorithm, on the basis of new theory, such that it can be used to efficiently count points on genus two curves over large finite fields. Examples of cryptographic size have been computed using an experimental Magma implementation of the algorithm which has been programmed by the author. Our computational results show that the quasi-quadratic algorithm of Lubicz and the author, with some improvements, is practical and relevant for cryptography.
Introduction
In this article we give the details of an effective point counting algorithm for genus two curves over finite fields of characteristic three, the complexity of which depends quadratically on the degree of the finite base field. Our algorithm is a modified version of an earlier method that was developed in joint work with Lubicz [4] . The main purpose of this paper is to show that the original algorithm of Lubicz and the author, with some improvements based on new theory, is practical for genus 2 curves over finite fields of cryptographiy size. We conclude that our point counting algorithm is relevant for curve based cryptography. The importance of genus 2 cryptosystems comes from the fact that the size of the base field can be chosen significantly smaller, namely half the size, than in the case of elliptic curve systems at the same security level. This makes genus 2 curves attractive for applications on crypto-devices with limitations on the computing resources. On the other hand, the quasi-quadratic dependency on the size of the base field makes it possible to compute curves over huge finite fields which are suitable for cryptography on the highest level of security.
Our point counting algorithm can be used for the generation of the key data that is necessary for public key cryptography on the basis of low genus curves over finite fields. Usually, the key data of an algebraic curve cryptosystem consists of the following objects (I) a non-singular projective curve C over a finite field F q with q elements, (II) a computational model of the Jacobian group variety J C of the curve C, (II) points P, Q ∈ J C (F q ) such that there exists an m ∈ N with [m](P ) = Q.
Given the above data one can for example encrypt or sign data using the generic ElGamal method. For a detailed discussion of curve based cryptography we refer to [8] . The problem of finding the number m from the given tuple (F q , C, J C , P, Q)
is called the discrete logarithm problem. A curve C over a finite field F q as above is considered as secure if the cardinality q of the finite field F q is such that the discrete logarithm problem in the group of F q -rational points J(F q ) is computationally infeasible. Provided that q has been chosen suitably large, giving the required security level, one has to make sure that the number of F q -rational points #J C (F q ) of the Jacobian has a large prime factor of bit size almost equal to g·log 2 (q), where g denotes the genus of the curve C. Under these assumptions, the generic methods for solving the discrete logarithm problem are not applicable. The choice of a sufficiently large finite field F q is a matter of finding a trade off between the desired security level and the efficiency of enand decryption functionality. To check whether a given key data (1) is secure in the above sense one has to compute and factorize the group order #J C (F q ). In this article we discuss the following problem in a special case. Problem 1.1 For a given finite field F q and a given curve C over F q , compute the number #J C (F q ).
Lubicz et al. have proven in [4] and [10] that there exists a quasi-quadratic algorithm which solves the Problem 1.1 in the case where the curve C is ordinary and hyperelliptic. Since their method depends polynomially on the characteristic of the finite field, in practice it is limited to small characteristics. In this article we describe some improvements of the original algorithm, based on new theory, and an implementation of the improved algorithm for ordinary genus 2 curves over finite fields of characteristic 3. This implementation has enabled us to compute examples of cryptographic size in a reasonable amount of time. Our computational results show that the method of Lubicz and the author, with some modification, is practical and relevant for cryptography. Let us now recall the precise result (compare [4, Th.3.1] ) in the special case that is discussed in this article. Theorem 1.2 One can give an effective algorithm which computes for an explicitly given non-singular ordinary genus 2 curve C, which is defined over a finite field F q of characteristic 3, the number #J C (F q ) in time O log(q) 2+ǫ for all ǫ > 0.
We give the algorithm of Theorem 1.2 in Section 2. Due to a limited amount of space, we don't give a complete proof of the correctness of our algorithm in here.
Let us remind the reader that a distinguished property of our algorithm is given by the fact that it is quasi-quadratic in the degree of the finite field. Other algorithms by Kedlaya [7] , Lauder and Wan [9] are just quasi-cubic, which makes a difference in practice if the size of the finite field is very large. The algorithm of this article performs well for genus two curves over finite fields of size far beyond the standards of state-of-the-art hyperelliptic curve cryptography.
Leitfaden
In Section 2 we give the details of the algorithm whose existence is claimed in Theorem 1.2. We give examples that have been computed using our algorithm in Section 3.
Algorithm
In this section we give the algorithm which is subject to Theorem 1.2. By F q we denote a finite field with q elements which is of characteristic 3. All computations in F q are supposed to be performed with polynomials in F 3 [x] modulo a fixed irreducible monic polynomialf over F 3 with deg(f ) = log 3 (q) using a fast polynomial arithmetic. With Z q we denote the ring Z 3 [x] modulo the ideal which is generated by a monic polynomial f ∈ Z[x] such thatf ≡ f mod 3 and deg(f ) = log 3 (p). The ring Z q is called the ring of Witt vectors with values in F q . We say that we are given an element x ∈ Z q with precision m if we have computed a bit string which represents the truncated 3-adic number x modulo 3 m . Let σ ∈ End Z3 (Z q ) denote the unique lift of the 3-rd power Frobenius of F q .
The input of the point counting algorithm consists, first, of a finite field F q in the above presentation and, secondly, of an ordinary curve C which is given by an equation of the form
where e 1 , e 2 , e 3 ∈ F q \ {0, 1} are pairwise distinct. We note that with only slight modification our algorithm can also be applied to hyperelliptic genus 2 curves of a more general form. The algorithm outputs the characteristic polynomial χ of the Frobenius endomorphism of the Jacobian variety J C of C which is given by the q-th powering map. From this one can obtain the number of F q -rational points #J C (F q ) of J C by evaluating the polynomial χ at the value 1. In the following sections we describe all steps of the point counting algorithm in detail.
(I) Compute a 6-theta null point T 6 of the curve C.
(II) Canonically lift the 6-theta null point T 6 to a canonical theta null point T 6 with sufficiently high precision.
(III) Compute the norm Norm(δ) of the determinant δ of a lift of the relative Verschiebung in terms of the coefficients ofT 6 .
(IV) Reconstruct the characteristic polynomial χ from the approximated value for Norm(δ).
Computation of theta null points
In this section we explain how to compute the 6-theta null point of a curve given by an equation of the form (2). First, one computes a 2-theta null point
possibly over an extension field, using the following classical Thomae formulae We note that for all possible roots in the formulas (4) one gets a valid 2-theta null point. In fact, the 2-theta null point (3) computed by means of the formulae (4) belongs to an abelian variety which is 2-isogenous to the Jacobian of the curve C defined by the equations (2). Let us fix some notation. We denote Z n = (Z/nZ) 2 for a natural number n ≥ 1. Suppose further that we have chosen embeddings Z n ֒→ Z m , whenever n|m.
Now once the 2-theta null point is established, one needs to extend the latter point to a smooth 6-theta null point which we denote by T 6 = (a u ) u∈Z6 . The point T 6 lies in the zero locus of the following equations
symmetry relations
where (u i , w i , z i , y i ) ∈ Z 4 6 for i = 1, 2 are equivalent quadruples.
We consider quadruples (v i , w i , x i , y i ) ∈ Z 4 6 (i = 1, 2) as equivalent if there exists a permutation matrix P ∈ Mat 4 (Z) such that
The 2-theta null point T 2 can be extended to a 6-theta null point T 6 using the above relations (5) and (6) . We set a 00 = b 00 , a 03 = b 01 , a 30 = b 10 , a 33 = b 11 .
Specializing the equations (5) and (6) at (a 00 , a 03 , a 30 , a 33 ) we obtain a zero dimensional algebraic set in the variables {Y u } u∈Z6\Z2 (see [4, Th.2.7] ). The finiteness of this algebraic set enables us to solve for a completed 6-theta null point T 6 = (a u ) u∈Z6 .
Theorem 2.1 There exists a smooth 6-theta null point T 6 = (a u ) u∈Z6 which forms an extension of the 2-torsion component (a 00 , a 03 , a 30 , a 33 ).
The proof of this fact involves sophisticated theory, so we are not able to give it in here. Here, smoothness means that some Jacobian criterion with respect to the Riemann relations and additional correspondence relations is satisfied at the point T 6 . We will make that precise in Section 2.2. We note that the smooth extension T 6 of Theorem 2.1 belongs to an abelian surface which is isogenous to the Jacobian of the curve C.
The following method forms an important improvement of the original algorithm as presented in [4, §3] . Instead of solving the relations (5) and (6) for a smooth 6-theta null point T 6 , we restrict to a smaller system of equations which makes the problem feasible in practice. where it is assumed that the finite field elements a 00 , a 03 , a 30 and a 33 have already been computed.
Theorem 2.2
The system of equations (7) defines a zero dimensional algebraic set.
The system (7) is readily solved by a standard Groebner basis algorithm on a normal desktop computer over finite fields of cryptographic size. For simplicity, we now assume that the given values a 00 , a 03 , a 30 , a 33 are defined over the field F q . Theorem 2.3 A smooth 6-theta null point
Let us remark that in most cases the degree of the field extension is small. Our computations show that for many examples it has degree lower or equal than 3. As a consequence of Theorem 2.3, one can compute for increasing extension degree the set S of four tuples (a 10 , a 13 , a 20 , a 23 ) that form a solution of the system (7). The homogeneity of the space of solutions of the Riemann relations with respect to the action of the automorphism group of the theta group implies that the solution set S also contains the quadruples (a 14 , a 11 , a 22 , a 25 ) (a 32 , a 31 , a 02 , a 01 ) (a 12 , a 15 , a 24 , a 21 ) Thus, by forming all possible combinations of solutions in S, one obtains as set of possible candidates for the 6-theta null point T 6 = (a u ) u∈Z6 . This completes our exposition of the initial computations in Step (I) of our algorithm.
Finally, let us give some further details of our implementation. One can quickly test whether a candidate for T 6 is a valid 6-theta null point using the special theta relation The smoothness of a candidate for T 6 is tested by computing the rank of the Jacobian matrix with respect to the Riemann relations, taken together with the correspondence relations (8) and (9) that we introduce at a later point. We will give a precise formulation of the smoothness criterion in Section 2.2. We remark that a different method for the computation of the 6-theta null point is suggested in [6] .
Canonical lifting
We use the notation of the preceding section. The computation of the canonical lifted 6-theta null point T 6 is realized by applying a Hensel lifting algorithm to a system of equations that we define in the following.
Consider the system of correspondence relations t∈Z6, 3t=u
where w, u ∈ Z 2 , and
where (x i , y i , v i , w i ) ∈ S (i = 1, 2) and S is defined as the set of all 4-tuples (x, y, v, w) ∈ Z 4 6 such that the sets {x + y, x − y} and {v + 3w, v − 3w} are equal and contained in Z 3 .
By general theory (compare [3] and [1] ) there exists a canonical liftT 6 = (ã u ) u∈Z6 of the 6-theta null point T 6 = (a u ) u∈Z6 to Z q . (8) a proof of the Theorem 2.4 can be found in the forthcoming preprint [5] .
Next we give a precise definition of the smoothness condition that is subject (6) are given by a set R of polynomials in the variables Y u where u ∈ U . By the same procedure, and by evaluating X 00 at 1, we obtain from the correspondence equations (8) and (9) as set of polynomials C in the variables X u and Y u where u ∈ U .
Definition 2. 5 We call a F q -rational simultaneous zero (a u ) u∈U of the polynomials in the set R a smooth point, if there exist polynomials f 1 , . . . , f 19 ∈ R ∪ C such that the matrix of partial derivatives
has non-zero determinant at the point (a u ) × (a 9 u ), where the index u ranges over U .
It is straight forward to test computationally, whether an F q -rational solution (a u ) u∈Z6 of the relations (5) and (6) is smooth in the sense of Definition 2.5. For example, one can form the Jacobian matrix of all relations in the set R ∪ C with respect to the the variables {Y u } and test whether the rank of the resulting matrix is equal to 19 at the point (a u ) × (a 9 u ). Now assume that we are given a smooth 6-theta null point T 6 = (a u ) u∈U . To find polynomials f 1 , . . . , f 19 in R ∪ C as in Definition 2.5, one searches over all polynomials in R until one has found 16 relations such that their Jacobian matrix has rank equal to 16. Then one has to find 3 additional polynomials in C such that the vertical join of the Jacobian matrices has rank 19 in total. As in Definition 2.5 we denote the Jacobian matrix of the resulting polynomials f 1 , . . . , f 19 with respect to the variables {Y u } u∈U by D Y . The matrix of partial derivatives of these polynomials with respect to the variables {X u } u∈U is denoted by D X . We note that necessarily the determinant of D X at (a u ) × (a 9 u ) equals zero.
We define a function Φ :
for all (x, y) = (
q . Suppose that we want to compute the canonical liftT 6 = (ã u ) u∈U of the 6-theta null point T 6 with given precision m. Assume that we are givenT 6 with precision ⌈m/2⌉. By Theorem 2. 4 we have
Using Taylor expansion it follows from the congruence (11) that
where ∆ ∈ Z 19 q , is equivalent to the congruence
Here we use the fact that the point T 6 = (a u ) u∈U , which is the reduction ofT 6 = (ã u ) u∈U modulo 3, is a smooth point, and consequently, the matrix D Y (T 6 ,T where ∆, v ∈ Z 19 q and A ∈ Mat(19, Z q ) is a square matrix which is singular modulo 3. The above congruence implies that solving the congruence
where ǫ ∈ Z 19 q , is equivalent to solving the congruence
where
The above calculations can be summarized in a lifting algorithm for 6-theta null points which is based on the fact that it is computationally straight forward to solve Artin-Schreier equations modulo 3. Using the above Hensel lifting principle one can compute the canonical theta null pointT 6 to given precision in time depending quasi-linearly on the precision and the value log 3 (q). We will specify the precision that we use in our point counting algorithm in Section 2.3.
We omit a detailed description of the method that we use to solve an ArtinSchreier equation of the form
whereĀ is a singular matrix modulo 3. The solution of the congruence (16) comes down to solving a linear system modulo 3. Since it is straight forward to adapt the method described in [10, Algo.5.2] to our situation, we don't give the details in here. This completes our description of the approximation of the canonically lifted 6-theta null pointT 6 that is the main objective of Step (II) of our algorithm.
Recovery of the characteristic polynomial
We use the notation of the preceding sections. For the rest of this section let F q denote the field of definition of the 6-theta null point T 6 = (a u ) u∈Z6 . Assume that we are given the canonically lifted 6-theta null pointT 6 = (ã u ) u∈Z6 with precision m. Suppose that we have normalizedT 6 such thatã 00 = 1. Let π 1 , π 2 be the 3-adically invertible eigenvalues of the absolute q-Frobenius endomorphism on the Jacobian variety J C of the curve C which is given by the equation (2). We setπ
Then the characteristic polynomial of Frobenius is given by the following polynomial with Q-coefficients
We note that the product π 1 π 2 of eigenvalues can be regarded as an element in Z 3 in an obvious way. We set
The number δ is called the determinant of relative Verschiebung.
Theorem 2.6 One has
Norm Zq/Z3 (δ) = ±π 1 π 2
An equivalent formula has been established in [4, Th.2.8] . A purely algebraic proof of Theorem 2.6 is given in the forthcoming preprint [5] . Theorem 2.6 implies that we can compute the product of eigenvalues π 1 π 2 up to sign with given precision. This concludes our remarks regarding Step (III) of our algorithm.
In the following we describe how one can compute a list of candidates for the characteristic polynomial χ(T ), which is part of Step (IV) of our algorithm. We note that the number of F q -rational points of the Jacobian variety J C of C is given by χ(1). One can eliminate the false candidates for χ(T ) by evaluating at 1 and performing point multiplications with random points in the group J C (F q ). We remark that there is a well-known algorithm for the addition of divisor classes in the group J C (F q ). This is folklore, so we don't give the details here. In the following we ignore the field extension that is necessary to compute a rational smooth 6-theta null point T 6 . An extension of the base field of the curve C can be compensated by taking appropriate roots of the eigenvalues π 1 and π 2 . Now let us briefly describe how one can compute the characteristic polynomial χ(T ) from the approximated product of eigenvalues π 1 π 2 . Assume that we are given a 3-adic number π such that π ≡ ±π 1 π 2 mod 3 m , where the precision is chosen such that m = 2 log 3 (q) + 2. The polynomial
is called the symmetric polynomial associated to χ(T ). In order to compute the characteristic polynomial χ(T ), one first computes candidates for the symmetric polynomial P sym (T ) in terms of π. By the above discussion one has
for some integers s and t, whose absolute value is smaller or equal to 9q. There exists an s 0 ∈ Z, whose residues 0 modulo 9 lies in the interval [0, . . . , 8], such that s ≡ ±π +s 0 q mod 9q. The algorithm for computing s simply tries all of the above possibilities for the residues 0 of s 0 . For each possibles 0 one gets a corresponding s, in terms of which we claim that one can compute the parameter t. Since |s| ≤ 9q, one can for every possible integer s compute an exact value for s 0 by the formula s 0 = s−(π+ q 2 π ) q . Finally, one chooses t ≡ π · s 0 mod 9q. The above described procedure determines a list of integer pairs (s, t) which give possible candidates for the polynomial P sym (T ). Now assume that we are given roots α and β of a candidate for the polynomial P sym (T ) in a suitable number field. Let τ 1 , . . . , τ 4 denote the roots of the polynomials P 1 (T ) = T 2 − αT + q 2 and P 2 (T ) = T 2 − βT + q 2 , in a suitable extension field of the rational numbers. Then candidates for the values ±π 2 1 and ±π 2 2 can be computed up to sign as products τ j τ k , where j, k ∈ {1, . . . , 4}. By taking square roots one obtains candidates for the eigenvalues π 1 and π 2 . The latter values determine the characteristic polynomial χ(T ) by the formulae (17). This finishes the exposition of our point counting algorithm.
Practical results
In this section we give an example of cryptographic size that was computed using our algorithm. A complete documentation of the example is available on the author's website [2] . Let f (T ) = T 120 + T 4 + 2 ∈ F 3 [T ]. We denote bȳ T the congruence class of the polynomial T modulo the modulus f . Consider the hyperelliptic genus 2 curve C over the finite field F 3 120 = F q [T ]/(f ) with defining equation yfinite field ? Note that the original algorithm depends polynomially on p g , where p is the characteristic and g is the genus of the curve.
2. Can one significantly reduce the number of variables in the canonical lifting algorithm which is described in Section 2 ? Some results that might turn out to be useful in this context are documented in [11] .
3. By introducing coarse invariants, which are supposed to be expressions in certain theta constants, can one avoid the field extensions that in some cases are necessary to obtain a rational theta null point ?
